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MCBURNEY V. YOUNG: TESTING 
THE LIMITS OF CITIZENS-ONLY 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS 
PATRICK JAMIESON 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In McBurney v. Young,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
will address important questions surrounding restrictions on open 
government access laws, which allow citizens to view and copy records 
held by their state government. At issue is Virginia’s Freedom of 
Information Act (VFOIA), which limits records requests to Virginia 
citizens and certain qualified journalists.2 Petitioners Mark McBurney 
and Roger Hurlbert joined together, alleging that VFOIA 
impermissibly discriminates against their rights under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.3 Additionally, Hurlbert, who makes his living 
retrieving property records for clients, argues that VFOIA stands in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.4 
McBurney presents an opportunity for the Court to define the 
ambiguous boundaries of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and 
the dormant Commerce Clause. Specifically, under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, the Court could address whether, as the Third 
Circuit decided, access to state records directly implicates one’s ability 
to engage in the national political process.5 Additionally, this case asks 
whether, under the dormant Commerce Clause, the restricted 
distribution of public records impermissibly discriminates against 
interstate commerce and whether such records can be construed as 
 
 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2014. I thank Professor Joseph Blocher, 
Andrew Hand, Christine Kearsley, Donata Marcantonio, Katie McEvilly, Tara McGrath, Ali 
Mirsaidi, Zi-Xiang Shen, and Sandra Yoo, all of whom provided excellent advice and edits.  
 1.  McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. argued Feb. 20, 2013). 
 2.  VA.CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(A) (West 2013). 
 3.  McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 458 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 5, 
2012). 
 4.  Id.   
 5.  See Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). For a discussion on Lee, see infra Part III, section C. 
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articles of commerce.6 Every state, particularly those with noncitizen 
access restrictions, will be watching intently to see whether the Court 
will mandate open access to state records, regardless of state 
citizenship. 
II. FACTS 
A. A History of Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act 
In 1968, Virginia’s General Assembly passed the Virginia Freedom 
of Information Act.7 The stated purpose of the statute is to provide 
the “people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records in 
the custody of a public body or its officers and employees, and free 
entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the business of the people 
is being conducted.”8 The statute provides, in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all public records 
shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizens of the 
Commonwealth . . . . Access to such records shall not be denied to 
citizens of the Commonwealth, representatives of newspapers and 
magazines with circulation in the Commonwealth, and 
representatives of radio and television stations broadcasting in or 
into the Commonwealth.9 
Virginia law provides that the State may recoup its cost of 
providing such records by “mak[ing] reasonable charges not to exceed 
its actual cost incurred in accessing, duplicating, supplying, or 
searching for the requested records.”10 Although the State recoups 
some of the expenses associated with providing records, it claims that 
“a significant portion of the costs associated with the provision of 
public records is borne by the taxpayers of the Commonwealth, not 
by the requesters of public records.”11 
B. Background of McBurney’s Case 
Mark McBurney, one of two petitioners in this case, is a resident 
of Rhode Island.12 Prior to moving to Rhode Island, McBurney 
 
 6.  Brief for Petitioners at 16–17, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Dec. 26, 2012). 
 7.  1968 Va. Acts 691.  
 8.  VA.CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B), para. 1 (West 2013).  
 9.  Id. § 2.2-3704(A) (emphasis added).  
 10.  Id. § 2.2-3704(F).  
 11.  Brief for Respondents at 2, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2013).   
 12.  McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 459 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 5, 
2012). 
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resided in Virginia and maintains ties to Virginia through his divorce 
order, child custody order, and child support order.13 When 
McBurney’s former wife failed to pay her child support obligations, 
he, while residing in Rhode Island, requested assistance from the 
Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) to petition 
for the unpaid child support obligations.14 Although the DCSE filed 
the request, McBurney’s child support payments were delayed by 
nine months.15 McBurney filed a VFOIA request with the DCSE “to 
get to the bottom of the agency’s repeated mishandling of its 
responsibility to enforce child support obligations owed by his former 
wife, a Virginian, while McBurney was living [out of state].”16 
McBurney argues that DCSE at least twice, and perhaps as many as 
four times, filed his petitions in courts that lacked jurisdiction.17 The 
State denied McBurney’s first VFOIA request, claiming that the 
requested information was confidential and protected under Virginia 
law, and emphasizing that McBurney was not a Virginia citizen.18 
McBurney made a second “substantively identical request” that the 
DCSE denied exclusively on the grounds that McBurney was not a 
Virginia citizen.19 McBurney later received some requested 
information under Virginia’s Government Data Collection and 
Dissemination Practices Act, but did not receive the general 
information he sought about how the DCSE handles claims like his.20 
C. Background of Hurlbert’s Case 
Roger Hurlbert is a California resident whose business involves 
obtaining property records from state and local governments for 
various clients throughout the United States, including Virginia.21 
Hurlbert obtains these documents “by making requests under state 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 13. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  McBurney, 667 F.3d at 459; see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-102 (“[N]o record, information 
or statistical registries concerning applicants for and recipients of . . . child support shall be 
made available except for purposes directly connected with the administration of such 
programs. Such purposes include establishing eligibility, determining the amount of . . . child 
support, and providing social services . . . .”); see also id. § 63.2-103 (“Information pertaining to 
actions taken on behalf of recipients of child support services may be disclosed to the recipient 
and other parties pursuant to Board regulations.”).   
 19.  McBurney, 667 F.3d at 459.  
 20.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 14.  
 21.  Id. at 12. 
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open-records statutes and negotiating with officials for their 
release.”22 In 2008, Hurlbert filed a VFOIA request in order to obtain 
property records for certain estate parcels in Virginia.23 The State 
denied Hurlbert’s request because he is not a citizen of Virginia.24 
D. Procedural History 
Joining together as plaintiffs, McBurney and Hurlbert filed a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
various state and local officials in Virginia.25 The district court held 
that McBurney and Hurlbert failed to show that the citizens-only 
provision of VFOIA burdened a fundamental right under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.26 Further, the district court held 
that VFOIA did not violate Hurlbert’s rights under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.27 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
holdings on both grounds.28 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Arduous Task of Defining Privileges and Immunities of State 
Citizenship 
The Supreme Court has observed that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause “is not one the contours of which have been 
precisely shaped by the process and wear of constant litigation and 
judicial interpretation over the years since 1789.”29 The Clause simply 
states: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges 
 
 22.  Id.    
 23.  Id.  
 24.  McBurney, 667 F.3d at 460.  
 25.  McBurney v. Mims, No. 03:09-CV-44, 2009 WL 1209037, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2009), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393 (4th Cir. 2010). A third 
plaintiff (a journalist) was present in the district court and on appeal at the Fourth Circuit, but 
she was not, however, listed as a plaintiff during the briefing to the United States Supreme 
Court. The district court initially dismissed all parties from the suit on jurisdictional grounds—
an issue not relevant to the present appeal. Id. at *7. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and 
reversed in part that dismissal, holding that the parties had standing to sue. McBurney, 616 F.3d 
at 403–04 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court then addressed the case once again before it was 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 780 F. Supp. 2d 
439, 446 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff’d sub nom. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012).    
 26.  McBurney, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 446.  
 27.  Id. at 452.  
 28.  McBurney, 667 F.3d at 458.  
 29.  Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978).  
POST-FINAL READ EDITS (RECOVERED AND FINISHED) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  2:26 PM 
2013] TESTING THE LIMITS OF CITIZENS-ONLY FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS 181 
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”30 The traditional 
meaning of the Clause comes from Corfield v. Coryell,31 which states 
that privileges and immunities “are, in their nature, fundamental; 
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and 
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several 
states which compose this Union.”32 Essentially, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause “prevents a State from discriminating against 
citizens of other States in favor of its own.”33 
The Court articulated a two-step inquiry in Supreme Court of 
Virginia v. Friedman34 (the Friedman test) to decide whether a state’s 
“citizenship or residency classification offends privileges and 
immunities protections.”35 First, “the activity in question must be 
sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation as to fall within the 
purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”36 The purview of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause is limited to significant 
discrimination involving “important economic liberties” and 
constitutional rights.37 Second, the Court will invalidate a law that 
deprives nonresidents of a protected privilege “only if [it] conclude[s] 
that the restriction is not closely related to the advancement of a 
substantial state interest.”38 
The Court has interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
to prevent a state from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of 
other states in: (1) pursuing a common calling within the state; (2) 
owning or disposing of privately held property within the state; (3) 
accessing the courts of the state; and (4) obtaining medical services.39 
As a result, the Court has, inter alia, declared unconstitutional state 
laws requiring nonresidents to pay more for trading licenses,40 
requiring nonresident commercial fishermen to pay significantly more 
 
 30.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.  
 31.  6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (opinion of Washington, J.).   
 32.  Id. at 551.    
 33.  Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).  
 34.  487 U.S. 59 (1988).   
 35.  Id. at 64.   
 36.  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 37.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481 (4th ed. 2011). Indeed, the Court 
has never applied the Privileges and Immunities Clause in cases outside of these two categories. 
Id.   
 38.  Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65 (citing Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 
274, 284 (1985)).  
 39.  McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 462–63 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 2, 
2012). 
 40.  Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 419 (1870). 
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for commercial fishing licenses,41 limiting admission to the bar to 
residents,42 and giving preference to residents over nonresidents with 
respect to employment in oil and gas leases.43 
Despite such prohibitions, states still may use state citizenship or 
residency to distinguish among persons, such as for purposes of 
suffrage or qualification for an elective office in the state.44 
Additionally, the Court has been mindful to distinguish recreational 
activities from activities that are a “means of a livelihood,” providing 
protection only to the latter category under the common calling 
justification.45 Indeed, in Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of 
Montana,46 the Court refused to strike down a Montana law that 
charged non-residents more than residents for an elk-hunting 
license.47 The Court decided that an “interest in sharing this limited 
resource on more equal terms with Montana residents simply does 
not fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”48 
It reasoned that “[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not basic to 
the maintenance or well-being of the Union.”49 
B. Awakening the Dormant Commerce Clause 
The dormant Commerce Clause—a judicially created doctrine 
derived from Congress’s Article I, Section 8 commerce power50—
provides that state and local laws cannot place an undue burden on 
interstate commerce.51 The threshold question under the dormant 
Commerce Clause is whether a state or local law affects interstate 
commerce, such as by regulating an article of commerce that travels 
interstate.52 
 
 41.  Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 420 (1952). 
 42.  Piper, 470 U.S. at 274 (1985) 
 43.  Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 534 (1978).  
 44.  See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (“Some 
distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation 
composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they 
hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States.”).  
 45.  See Piper, 470 U.S. at 279 (describing elk hunting as “recreation” and not as a “means 
of a livelihood”).  
 46.  436 U.S. 371 (1978).   
 47.  Id. at 391.   
 48.  Id. at 388.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 51.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 430.  
 52.  See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“[I]t is clear that the 
appellants’ order does affect and burden interstate commerce, and the question then becomes 
whether it does so unconstitutionally.”).  
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If the law affects interstate commerce, then the inquiry transitions 
into a two-tiered analysis.53 The first tier asks whether the state or 
local law, read on its face, discriminates against out-of-staters.54 By 
“discrimination,” the Court “simply means differential treatment of 
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former 
and burdens the latter.”55 If a law discriminates on its face, it is 
“virtually per se invalid.”56 For a facially discriminatory law to be 
constitutional, the state must show “that it advances a legitimate local 
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”57 The review the Court undertakes is 
akin to a very strict version of strict scrutiny.58 
If a law is not facially discriminatory, the Court moves to a second 
tier, which it articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.59 (the Pike test), 
to determine if the law is discriminatory to out-of-staters as applied. 
The Pike test dictates that nondiscriminatory regulations are valid 
“unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”60 The Pike test 
weighs the benefits of a law against the burdens it imposes on 
interstate commerce.61 Most relevant to McBurney are cases involving 
laws limiting out-of-staters’ access to in-state resources and laws 
requiring use of local businesses. In City of Philadelphia v. New 
Jersey,62 the Court struck down a New Jersey law that restricted 
landfill use to in-state waste under the dormant Commerce Clause.63 
The Court held that New Jersey could have reduced landfill use in a 
less restrictive manner by “slowing the flow of all waste . . . even 
 
 53.  Id.   
 54.  United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida–Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338 (2007). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994).  
 57.  Id. at 101.  
 58.  See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“At a minimum such facial 
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the 
absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.”).  
 59.  397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 60.  Id. at 142; see also note 67, infra (discussing how some Justices think that balancing 
should not be used in evaluating dormant Commerce Clause cases).  
 61.  See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will 
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”).  
 62.  437 U.S. 617 (1978).  
 63.  Id. at 629.   
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though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected.”64 Further, 
in Pike, the Court invalidated an Arizona regulation that required 
cantaloupes grown in the state to also be packaged within the state.65 
The effect of the law would have been to force growers in the state to 
build packing facilities in the state.66 Even though balancing has 
remained the usual approach, some are critical of the test and 
recommend abandoning it because “the interests on both sides are 
incommensurate.”67 
C. Circuit Split(?): The Third Circuit’s Decision in Lee v. Minner 
In Lee v. Minner,68 the Third Circuit considered whether Delaware 
could restrict access to state records to its own citizens.69 There, an 
out-of-state journalist desired access to various state records and filed 
an open records request that the State subsequently denied. The 
Court held that the citizens-only provision in the Delaware Freedom 
of Information Act (DFOIA) was unconstitutional because “access to 
public records is a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.”70 The court reasoned that access to public records is 
necessary to engage in political advocacy, “an ‘essential activity’ which 
‘bear[s] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.’”71 In this 
sense, the court held that DFOIA was “facially discriminatory insofar 
as it limits access to information to those individuals who are citizens 
of the [s]tate.”72 Additionally, the court held that because DFOIA 
precluded noncitizens from obtaining any DFOIA information, its 
burden on noncitizens was substantial.73 Because the Third Circuit 
 
 64.  Id. at 626–27.  
 65.  Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.  
 66.  Id. at 140.  
 67.  See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (advocating for the elimination of the Pike test and arguing that the default rule 
should be: “a state statute is invalid under the Commerce Clause if, and only if, it accords 
discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required to achieve a lawful 
state purpose”); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[S]uch an inquiry is ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken 
rarely if at all.”); Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1106 (1986) (arguing that in dormant 
Commerce Clause cases not involving the movement of goods, the Court has not engaged in 
open-ended balancing and instead has certain limited goals beyond economic protectionism).  
 68.  458 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 69.  Id. at 195. 
 70.  Id. at 200.   
 71.  Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978)).  
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id.   
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focused its holding on the right to engage in political advocacy, it did 
not decide whether DFOIA unconstitutionally burdened the 
challenger’s right to engage in the common calling of journalism on 
equal footing with journalists in Delaware.74 
D. State Records under the Commerce Clause 
A central question of the McBurney case is whether state records 
themselves are articles of commerce and whether the retrieval of such 
records affects interstate commerce. As the Court has held, “[a]ll 
items of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection.”75 
Relatedly, such items and activities are subject to dormant Commerce 
Clause restrictions.76 The Court has not directly held that all state 
public records constitute interstate commerce. However, the Court 
has held, in Reno v. Condon,77 that “drivers’ personal, identifying 
information is . . . an article of commerce.”78 The Court noted that the 
“sale or release of [such records] into the interstate stream of business 
is sufficient to support congressional regulation.”79 Likewise, the 
Court has not directly held that the service of disseminating or 
retrieving public records is commerce,80 yet the Court has recognized 
that the Commerce Clause extends to both the sale of actual goods 
and to services.81 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners’ Arguments 
The thrust of the Petitioners’ arguments is embodied in the 
unifying notion of horizontal federalism: the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause work together to 
 
 74.  John Paul Jones & Afsana Chowdhury, Administrative Law, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 7, 38 
(2012). For a further discussion on this, see Part V, infra.  
 75.  City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (noting that even “valueless 
waste” merits constitutional scrutiny).  
 76.  See Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 
(1997) (“The definition of ‘commerce’ is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state 
legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation.”).  
 77.  528 U.S. 141 (2000).  
 78.  Id. at 141–42.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  See, e.g., C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (“[T]he 
article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and 
disposing of it.”); Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 577 n.10 (1977) (“We have long 
noted the applicability of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to service industries.”). 
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“avoid[] friction and help[] ‘fuse into one Nation a collection of 
independent, sovereign States.’”82 Indeed, the common origin of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause in 
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation demonstrates the 
Framers’ intent that the two clauses “secure and perpetuate” the 
“mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of different 
states.”83 Because the Articles of Confederation did not provide for a 
federal enforcement mechanism, “Article IV was routinely flouted by 
the states, many of which passed laws giving ‘preference to their own 
citizens.’”84 This history supports Petitioners’ argument that the two 
provisions mutually reinforce Constitutional rights: the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause acts as a “direct restraint” and the Commerce 
Clause acts as an “implied restraint.”85 Together, the provisions inform 
the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of state citizenship—a 
concept Petitioners argue is fundamentally at odds with VFOIA’s 
citizens-only restriction.86 
Petitioners advance four points in support of their Privileges and 
Immunities argument. First, they contend that VFOIA violates 
Hurlbert’s right to pursue a common calling by denying him the 
ability to collect, synthesize, and distribute records for a profit solely 
on the basis of his state citizenship.87 Second, Petitioners argue that 
Hurlbert’s access to property records is a fundamental right protected 
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.88 Because the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause protects the right to “take, hold, and dispose of 
property” across state lines,89 Petitioners argue that access to property 
records is a “necessary corollary” and thus a right protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.90 Third, Petitioners contend that 
 
 82.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 19–20 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 
395 (1948)).  
 83.  Id. at 20 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1).  
 84.  Id. (quoting 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 317 (Farrand, ed., 
1911)).  
 85.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 23 (quoting United Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984)). 
 86.  Id. at 23–24.  
 87.  Id. at 36.  
 88.  Id. at 39. Going back to 1789, Virginia law barred ‘“any county surveyor’ from 
‘withholding’ copies of land surveys from ‘any person,’ but extended this right to ‘any person or 
persons, not resident within this state,’ provided they had paid the required copying fees or given 
adequate security.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 12 HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 589–90 
(1787)). 
 89.  Id. at 41 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (opinion 
of Washington, J.)).  
 90.  Id. at 41–42 (citing Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 387 
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McBurney’s requested public records implicate his right to access 
public proceedings.91 Without being able to access information about 
how administrative proceedings are conducted, the right to access 
such proceedings is frustrated.92 Thus, by precluding informational 
access, VFOIA is essentially precluding access to the public 
proceeding itself.93 This violates the Constitutional principle that a 
state cannot restrict access to the courts based on state citizenship.94 
Lastly, Petitioners contend that the Fourth Circuit construed the 
scope of the Third Circuit’s decision in Lee v. Minner too narrowly.95 
Petitioners do not contend that there is a “constitutional right to have 
access to particular government information,” but rather that Virginia 
cannot discriminate on the basis of state citizenship, absent good 
reasons, as to who can access such information.96 
With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, the Petitioners 
argue that VFOIA discriminates against out-of-state economic 
interests both on its face and in effect. As a threshold matter, 
Petitioners argue that state public records are “articles of commerce” 
under the Commerce Clause as supported by the Court’s decision in 
Reno v. Condon, which recognized that public records containing 
drivers’ information are “articles of commerce” because they are 
“released, sold, compiled into databases, and resold for various 
commercial purposes.”97 Accordingly, Petitioners further argue that 
the business of retrieving records for compensation is in itself 
commerce.98 
Addressing the first-tier of the dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis, Petitioners argue that VFOIA facially discriminates against 
 
(1978)).  
 91.  Id. at 44 (“The Privileges and Immunities Clause should not be read to allow states to 
bar citizens of other states from equal access to their administrative proceedings, which 
necessarily includes basic information about how those proceedings are conducted.”).  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. at 42. The Clause “secures citizens of one state the right to resort to the courts of 
another, equally with the citizens of the latter state.” Id. (quoting Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Clarendon 
Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 95.  Id. at 46.  
 96.  Id. (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (plurality opinion) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 97.  Id. at 26 (quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2000) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 98.  Id.; see also C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (“[T]he 
article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and 
disposing of it.”).    
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out-of-state economic interests because it expressly reserves access to 
public records to Virginia citizens, which in turn prohibits out-of-state 
citizens from engaging in the commercial activity of retrieving records 
for compensation.99 Even if VFOIA were not facially discriminatory, 
Petitioners contend, under the Pike analysis, that VFOIA’s burden on 
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the benefits 
created.100 Petitioners rely on C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of 
Clarkstown101 to advance the argument that Virginia “reserves the 
‘initial processing step’ of record retrieval to local businesses, denying 
out-of-state businesses primary access to the market for Virginia 
record retrieval just like the flow control ordinance in Carbone 
denied out-of-state haulers entry into the market for the initial 
processing [of] the town’s garbage.”102 
Petitioners also contend that Virginia’s justification that the costs 
associated with giving non-Virginians access to public records would 
reduce resources available to Virginians is factually wrong because 
Virginia law authorizes the State to recoup administrative costs 
through fees.103 Petitioners argue there is “no basis for concluding the 
burden of processing out-of-state record requests would be greater 
than the burden of supervising out-of-state lawyers . . . or processing 
out-of-state fishing licenses.”104 As a result, Petitioners suggest there 
are less restrictive means available—and that the “purported goal of 
avoiding administrative burdens has nothing to do with the 
requesters’ citizenship.”105 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents frame the Privileges and Immunities question 
narrowly: “whether a statutorily created right to an at or below cost 
 
 99.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 25.   
 100.  Id. at 28. Respondents argue that Petitioners failed to adequately address a second-tier 
Pike challenge in the Fourth Circuit Briefing. Brief for Respondents, supra note 11, at 38 & n.9 
(“Although petitioners claim to have given fair notice of a Pike argument in their summary of 
the argument in their Fourth Circuit brief . . . a fair reading of that argument discloses only a 
first-tier discrimination challenge.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 
Fourth Circuit held that Hurlbert waived any challenge to the district court’s holding on the 
Pike analysis. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 467 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. 
Oct. 2, 2012) (“Hurlbert has waived any challenge to that component of the district court's 
analysis by not raising it in his opening brief.” (citing Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A))).    
 101.  511 U.S. 383 (1994).   
 102.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 29 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392).  
 103.  Id. at 47.   
 104.  Id. at 50–51 (citations omitted).   
 105.  Id. at 53.   
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search of government records is a fundamental privilege for purposes 
of the Clause.”106 Respondents argue VFOIA’s purpose is political, not 
economic: “[I]t is . . . intended to increase transparency in the political 
process . . . [and it] is logically and properly bestowed on those 
directly affected by that political process—i.e., citizens—and on media 
with a Virginia presence.”107 Under this umbrella, Respondents 
advance five arguments addressing Petitioners’ Privileges and 
Immunities claims. 
First, with respect to Hurlbert’s common calling argument, 
Respondents differentiate between cases that involve explicit bans or 
discriminatory monetary penalties on nonresidents performing work 
in a state and VFOIA’s “remote . . . incidental effect on whatever 
business model [Hurlbert] chooses.”108 Second, responding to 
Hurlbert’s property argument, Virginia argues that “records required 
by law to be maintained by the clerks of the courts” are exempt from 
VFOIA.109 Further, documents, including title documents, judgment 
liens, tax liens, and financial statements, are “open to inspection” and 
copying “by any person.”110 
Third, addressing McBurney’s “public proceedings” argument, 
Respondents argue that McBurney was denied only of “some 
undefined portion of the pre-suit discovery which he wanted the 
government to perform on his behalf”—assistance that “has never 
been thought to be a fundamental right protected by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.”111 Fourth, Respondents contend that an 
equal right to access government information has never been deemed 
fundamental under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.112 Although 
Respondents do not directly reference the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Lee, they attempt to show that any right of access to public documents 
was not recognized at common law anywhere in the United States at 
the time of the Framing and is “not sufficiently uniform or generous 
to give rise to any equal right of access which could be deemed 
 
 106.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 11, at 18. 
 107.  Id. at 19.   
 108.  Id. at 20.   
 109.  Id. at 21.  
 110.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 111.  Id. at 22–23.  
 112.  Id. at 23. Respondents argue that the Court should look no further than the original 
meaning of “Privileges and Immunities”—protecting nonresidents from “the disabilities of 
alienage.” Id. at 24 (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 380–81 & 
n.19 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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fundamental for purposes of the [Clause].”113 Fifth, Respondents 
argue that “practices and procedures directed to the performance of 
state governmental functions may distinguish between citizens and 
noncitizens.”114 Respondents base their argument on the fact that 
there is no fundamental right to access public information and a state 
may therefore distinguish between citizens and noncitizens when 
providing access.115 As a result of its unprotected status, Respondents 
argue that it does not carry the burden of demonstrating a substantial 
relationship between the ends and means of VFOIA.116 
Respondents contend that the dormant Commerce Clause is not 
even implicated here because VFOIA is purely an exercise of a 
governmental noncommercial function, whereby the State makes 
records “potentially available to certain requesters, its citizens, who 
might or might not put them into interstate commerce.”117 
Respondents argue that Petitioners’ reliance on Condon for the 
proposition that state records are “articles of commerce” is misplaced 
and that Virginia, “in discharging a governmental noncommercial 
function,” has simply made records available to its citizens who may 
choose to put them into interstate commerce.118 This, Respondents 
argue, is a “governmental noncommercial function.”119 If Congress 
desired to regulate the dissemination of state records through the 
active Commerce Clause, Respondents argue that the Court would be 
inclined to examine the effects of a citizens-only restriction.120 
However, because Congress does not regulate the dissemination of 
state records, Respondents do not engage in the two-tier dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, believing that the threshhold requirement 
was not satisfied.121  
 
 
 113.  Id. at 30–31.  
 114.  Id. at 32.  
 115.  Id. at 36.  
 116.  Id.   
     117.    Id. at 39 & n.11.   
 118.  Id. at 39. On Condon, Respondents argue that “[t]he actual holding . . . was that 
Congress had the power to enact the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act under the active 
Commerce Clause because States were engaged in traditional interstate commerce by selling 
certain records in the interstate markets.” Id.  
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id. at 39–40.  
 121.  Id. at 37.  
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V. ANALYSIS 
The Court’s holding in this case will most strongly affect 
noncitizens, journalists, advocacy groups, academics, and professional 
records collectors. In reviewing the federal Freedom of Information 
Act,122 the Court has noted that the purpose of open records acts is “to 
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.”123 In addition to the 
federal open records law, all fifty states have codified freedom of 
information laws.124 A holding favoring Petitioners under either the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause 
could greatly expand the meaning of open records laws in the few 
states that have noncitizens access restrictions. Although such laws 
currently serve the primary function of ensuring government 
accountability and transparency, the Court could read in a commercial 
component to these statutes. Accordingly, states would be forced to 
provide records on an equal basis to in-state and out-of-state citizens 
and corporations or not provide records to anyone. Furthermore, two 
other states enforce some form of a citizen-only access restriction like 
Virginia’s: Arkansas125 and Tennessee.126 In addition to the successful 
challenge of Delaware’s Freedom of Information Act,127 Tennessee’s 
open access statute recently faced a challenge at the district court 
level and is currently awaiting review by the Sixth Circuit.128 
 
 122.  5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2013).  
 123.  Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).  
 124.  Shannon E. Martin & Jessica Brophy, Industries’ Proprietary Information and the 
Freedom of Access to State-Held Information: A Review of the Law and its Implications for 
Special Interest Businesses, 58 S.C. L. REV. 831, 832 (2007).  
 125.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(A) (West 2013) (“Except as otherwise specifically 
provided by this section or by laws specifically enacted to provide otherwise, all public records 
shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the State of Arkansas during the 
regular business hours of the custodian of the records.”).  
 126.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(2)(A) (West 2013) (“All state, county and municipal 
records shall, at all times during business hours . . . be open for personal inspection by any 
citizen of this state and those in charge of the records shall not refuse such right of inspection to 
any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.”); see infra note 128.   
 127.  See Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding DFOIA).  
 128.  See generally Jones v. City of Memphis, 868 F.Supp.2d 710 (W.D. Tenn. 2012). In 
Jones, an out-of-state resident brought suit against various Tennessee authorities challenging 
the constitutionality of the Tennessee open records statute. Id. at 715. The challenger was a 
volunteer for the National Action Network and resided in Ohio. Id. He sought the release of 
records regarding state contracts. Id. The State denied his petition on the ground that he was 
not a citizen of Tennessee. Id. On the State’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court 
held that a noncitizen’s volunteer activities in a civil rights organization did not amount to a 
“common calling” protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 721. The 
District Court also held that the Tennessee law violated neither the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause nor the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 727–28. The plaintiff in Jones filed an appeal 
with the Sixth Circuit, but the Sixth Circuit has stayed all proceedings until a decision in 
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A. Privileges and Immunities Clause 
Even armed with strong policy justifications, this case will be an 
uphill battle for the Petitioners under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause given the limited group of recognized fundamental rights 
under the Clause and the particularized nature of each Petitioner’s 
requests.129 McBurney’s case is arguably much weaker than Hurlbert’s 
because his request concerns an individual child support claim. The 
Third Circuit in Lee v. Minner explicitly noted that the right at issue 
must involve “matters of both national political and economic 
importance.”130 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that States must 
accord citizens and noncitizens equal treatment only with respect to 
those privileges and immunities “bearing on the vitality of the Nation 
as a single entity.”131 Because McBurney’s requested information is 
arguably of personal, rather than of national, importance, the Court 
will likely find that his request does not implicate the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Additionally, McBurney’s assertion that the denial 
of his VFOIA request burdens his right to access courts is weak at 
best. McBurney’s request does not concern access to a court 
proceeding, but rather access to “documents to help decide whether 
he should file a lawsuit.”132 The Court will likely follow the Fourth 
Circuit’s holding that the Clause does not protect “a mechanism for 
pre-lawsuit discovery.”133 
On the other hand, Hurlbert’s case has a higher chance of success. 
The Court could hold that VFOIA directly interferes with Hurlbert’s 
 
McBurney comes from the Supreme Court. Order to Stay Appellate Proceedings Pending the 
Resolution of McBurney v. Young, Jones v. City of Memphis, No. 12-5558 (6th Cir. 2012).  
 129.  Indeed, the difficulty of prevailing on the Privileges and Immunities argument became 
fairly apparent at oral argument. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, McBurney v. 
Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. 2012) (including repeated questions by the Justices regarding how the 
purpose of VFOIA could extend beyond general government accountability, and failing to 
discuss the specific facts of McBurney’s claim with respect to the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause); see also Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: Agnosticism as an argument, SCOTUS BLOG 
(Feb. 20, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/argument-recap-agnosticism-as-an-
argument/ (“Before [Respondents] took the lectern, it was quite obvious that the case was going 
[their] way. Although [Petitioners’] woes could easily be exaggerated by making too much of 
Justice Scalia as a determined adversary, neither of [Petitioners’] basic arguments was working 
very well for [them].”).  
 130.  Lee, 458 F.3d at 196 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 131.  Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 65 (1988)  
 132.  McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 467 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 2, 
2012) (quoting McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 780 F.Supp.2d 439, 449 (E.D. Va. 2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 133.  Id. at 467 (quoting Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65).  
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right to pursue a common calling.134 Lee does not provide much 
guidance on the potential success of such an argument, however, 
because the Lee Court explicitly declined to address whether DFOIA 
substantially burdened the challenger’s right to pursue a common 
calling.135 Thus, the Third Circuit did not balance Lee’s right to pursue 
his common calling with the relative burden DFOIA imposed. The 
Supreme Court will be left to compare Hurlbert’s case to a limited set 
of common calling cases where states explicitly banned or 
significantly burdened out-of-staters’ abilities to conduct business in a 
particular state.136 
A holding in favor of McBurney and Hurlbert only under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause would have a limited effect on the 
dissemination of public records because the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause applies only to individuals, not corporations.137 As 
several amici point out, “[a] decision of this Court striking down the 
Virginia statute as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
alone leaves states free to attempt to bar out-of-state corporations 
from access to Virginia public records while affording that access to 
Virginia corporations.”138 Additionally, a narrow holding under only 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause could leave Virginia’s out-of-
state media exception unclear. VFOIA provides that “representatives 
of newspapers and magazines with circulation in the Commonwealth, 
and representatives of radio and television stations broadcasting in or 
into the Commonwealth” shall have access to public records.139 
However, this provision notably leaves out Internet media 
organizations, including those that have substantial readership in 
 
 134.  Such a holding would be similar to the Court’s handling of other common calling cases. 
See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984) 
(finding that a state statute violated a noncitizen’s right to a common calling); Hicklin v. 
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (same); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 385 (1948) (same); 
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (same). 
 135.  See Lee, 458 F.3d at 199 (“Because we conclude that the second right asserted by 
Lee—the right to ‘engage in the political process with regard to matters of national political and 
economic importance’—is protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we need not 
address [the common calling argument].” (citation omitted)).  
 136.  See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (holding 
that a state cannot restrict bar admission to state citizens); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 152 (holding that 
a state cannot restrict commercial shrimp fishing activities to state citizens).  
 137.  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168, 178 (1869) (holding that a corporation did not 
constitute a citizen for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).  
 138.  Brief for The Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 9, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013).  
 139.  VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704 (West 2013).   
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Virginia.140 As one amicus notes, “[a] straightforward reading of 
VFOIA’s media exception would leave out online media as they do 
not circulate in a tangible print form similar to magazines or 
broadcast over the air similar to television news.”141 
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Petitioners advance a strong and convincing argument that state 
records fall under the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
First, the actions of collecting, trading, buying, selling, and aggregating 
state records simply sound like commerce. Individuals like Hurlbert 
engage in the for-profit practice of collecting and aggregating state 
records in order to sell them.142 The service Hurlbert provides does 
not seem too attenuated from that of a manufacturing company that 
manufactures a product in-state and then distributes it to retail 
locations around the globe. 
Second, public records can be understood as articles of commerce. 
Petitioners hope that the Court will look to its holding in Reno v. 
Condon—that public records containing drivers’ information are 
“article[s] of commerce”—and expand it to say that all public records 
are articles of commerce.143 There is good reason for the Court to do 
just that. For one, private sector companies “have relied upon public 
records to obtain personal information about individuals for 
marketing purposes.”144 Additionally, for decades states “have been 
selling their public records to the highest bidder.”145 Numerous 
companies across the country have amassed these public records—in 
2004, there were more than 165 companies offering public records 
information on the Internet,146 a number that may be even higher 
today. If companies are in the business of gathering the types of 
 
 140.  See Brief for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Jan 2, 2013) (“An 
out-of-state journalist desired access to various state records and filed an open records 
request.”).   
 141.  Id. at 22.  
 142.  McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 463 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 2, 
2012). 
 143.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 28 (quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 
(2000)).  
 144.  Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2002).  
 145.  Id. at 1150. Solove notes that the state practice of selling drivers’ information was 
largely restricted when Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the subject of the 
constitutional inquiry in Condon. Id. at 1150–51; see also Condon, 528 U.S. at 148–49.  
 146.  Solove, supra note 144, at 1152–53.  
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records available to Virginia’s citizens under VFOIA, then these 
records are “articles of commerce.”147 
Petitioners have the best chance of success under the first tier of 
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The largest hurdle 
Petitioners have to overcome is convincing the Court that VFOIA 
affects interstate commerce.148 If the Court accepts this, Petitioners 
simply have to show that VFOIA treats in-state and out-of-state 
interests differently, to the benefit of in-state interests.149 On its face, 
VFOIA explicitly draws a distinction between in-state and out-of-
state citizens.150 If the Court has recognized that VFOIA affects 
interstate commerce and that public records are “articles of 
commerce,” the Court will likely hold this statute to be discriminatory 
under the first tier of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. If the 
Court does not accept the first-tier analysis, Petitioners will be left in 
the land of the unpredictable Pike test.151 The biggest challenge 
Petitioners face here is overcoming the argument that, at best, 
VFOIA is not a regulation of commerce, but rather a state practice 
that has an “incidental effect [that] may be disproportionate.”152 Given 
the unpredictability of the effects test under Pike, the Court could do 
one of two things: It could find that the small burden VFOIA places 
on Hurlbert outweighs any possible financial or administrative benefit 
to the State, or it could find that the burden on Hurlbert is not clearly 
excessive in relation to the benefits to the State.153 Ultimately, the 
Commerce question is really two questions for the Court to decide: Is 
 
 147.  See Condon, 528 U.S. at 148 (holding that drivers’ records were articles of commerce 
that trigger dormant Commerce Clause review).   
 148.  See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (noting that once a statute is 
found to affect or burden interstate commerce, the inquiry becomes whether it discriminates on 
its face).  
 149.  United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida–Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
338 (2007). 
 150.  VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(A) (West 2013).  
 151.  See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (commenting that Pike balancing “is more like judging whether a particular line 
is longer than a particular rock is heavy”). 
 152.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 129, at 11 (noting that VFOIA “is not a 
regulation of Commerce” but rather it only has an incidental effect on commerce). 
 153.  See Regan, supra note 67, at 1106 (noting that Hunt offers a “strict” balancing test 
while Pike offers a “weak” balancing test). Compare Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (“[T]he burden falls on the State to justify [the 
discrimination] in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interest at stake.” (emphasis 
added)), with Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (finding that the statute will be upheld unless the burden it 
imposes on commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the benefits).  
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this commerce, and does VFOIA discriminate—either on its face or in 
effect? Thus, McBurney presents the Court with an opportunity to 
answer these questions and perhaps even clarify the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Petitioners in this case certainly face an uphill battle. The Court 
has yet to recognize a right to “engage in the political process with 
regard to matters of both national political and economic 
importance” as explicitly as the Third Circuit did in Lee, let alone 
recognize a relationship between accessing state records and 
participating in the national political process.154 Ultimately, however, 
the Privileges and Immunities argument proves most difficult because 
at its core, the Clause protects only the rights “basic to the 
maintenance or well-being of the Union.”155 In McBurney’s case, an 
individual’s records request for personal purposes does not appear to 
satisfy this high threshold. Hurlbert’s challenge is stronger because it 
concerns commerce, both on the level of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. Here, the 
Court is faced with a statute that squarely discriminates between 
citizens and noncitizens. If Hurlbert is able to overcome the challenge 
of proving that state records constitute articles of commerce, he will 
likely prevail under the first-tier dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 
Regardless of its outcome, McBurney presents the Court with a 
significant opportunity to clarify the relationship between the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause 
and to better define the contours of each respective provision. 
 
 
 154. See Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 155.  Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).   
